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Moralityas Interpretation*
JosephRazt

With the growinginterestin interpretationas an activityessentialin the study
of the artsand of societyitwas inevitablethatthe questionofthe relationbetween
moralityand interpretationwould attractconsiderableinterest.Given thatmoral
viewsand argumentsare expressed in language, are essentiallylanguage bound,
thereis no doubt thatthe understandingof moral viewsand argumentinvolves,
at least at times,interpretation(of argumentsand propositions,etc.). The same
can be said of physics.The question is whethermoralityis interpretativein a
way in which physicsis not. Some writershave claimed thatit is. I will examine
the claims and arguments to that effectadvanced by Michael Walzer, though
much of my argument will be general and not limited to the arguments he
explicitlyadvances.'
THE MAIN THESES
At the beginning of his book Walzer declares his intentionto defend the view
that "the path of interpretation"in moral philosophy is the one that "accords
best withour everydayexperience of morality"(p. 3).2 Later on, he explains:
What we do when we argue is to give an account of the actuallyexisting
morality.That moralityis authoritativefor us because it is only by virtue
of its existence that we exist as the moral beings we are. Our categories,
relationships,commitments,and aspirationsare all shaped by, expressed
in termsof, the existingmorality.[P. 21]
One might say that the moral world is authoritativefor us because it
provides us with everythingwe need to live a moral life, including the
capacityfor reflectionand criticism.... The capacityfor criticismalways
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extends beyond the "needs" of the social structureitselfand itsdominant
groups. I do not want to defend a functionalposition. The moral world
and the social worldare more or less coherent.Moralityis alwayspotentially
subversiveof class and power. [Pp. 21-22]
The general question about the rightthing to do is quicklyturned into
some more specificquestion-about the career open to talents,let's say,
and then about equal opportunity,affirmative
action, and quotas. These
... require us to argue about what a career is, what sorts of talents we
ought to recognise,whetherequal opportunityis a "right.". . . These questionsare pursued withina traditionof moral discourse-indeed theyonly
arise withinthattradition-and theyare pursued byinterpreting
the terms
of that discourse. The argumentis about ourselves; the meaning of our
way of life is what is at issue. The general question we finallyanswer is
not quite the one we asked at first.It has a crucial addition: what is the
rightthingforus to do? [P. 23]
Walzer's argument is based on the assumptionthat some moral claims are
better,or betterfounded, than others. This does not commithim to the view
thatall moral statementsare eithertrue or false,but it commitshim to holding
that some moral claims are true and some false. Where a moral claim is better
foundedthananother,thestatementthatitis,is true,and itsdenial false.Moreover,
in such cases various statementsentailed by the precept that people should act
in accordance withthe betterclaim are, presumably,true too.3
Giventhisassumption,Walzeradvances one major and one subsidiarythesis:
Ti: Argumentsin moral philosophy are interpretationsof the morality
that exists.
T2: Even so, there is plentyof room for social criticism.
Three main intuitionsinspire the theses. First,and most important,is the
view thatmoralityis sociallydependent, thatis, thatwhat is rightand wrongfor
a person to do, whatis good or bad, laudable or deplorable,virtuousor revealing
of moral defectsin character,etc., depends on social practices.Second, morality
does not forma systemof principlesand preceptsarranged in some logical way
(in the way in which, e.g., Rawls's theoryof justice is a system),nor is there a
specialmethod(likedecisionbehinda veilofignorance,or thetestofthecategorical
imperative)fordiscoveringor testingmoral claims. Third, our societyis not the
only morallydecent societythat ever existed. Nor is it the morallybest society
thatever existed,withothersocietiesmere stagesof imperfectioncompared with
us. Nor are othermorallydecent societiesin the past or in the presentnecessarily
more like ours than those societiesthatare less morallyappealing, thatis, there
are ways of being moral and having a morallydecent environmentwhich are
veryunlike our ways of being morallydecent, and in environmentsveryunlike
ours.
These statementsof the intuitionsare veryvague. The degree to whichthe
intuitionsare controversialdepends on their more precise formulations.Few
people deny that what is rude, arndthereforeon occasion immoral,depends on
3. As the statementof Walzer's assumption above makes clear, his view is consistent
withthe existenceof a widespreadmoral incommensurability,
leading to considerabletruth
value gaps. The general driftof his argumentsuggeststhat he regards intrasocialmoral
issues as largely morally determinate,while contemplatingextensive moral incommensurabilitywhere intersocialcomparisonsare in question.
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social practices.Many deny thatthe contentof moralityis exclusivelydetermined
bythe social practicesof,let us say,the societyto whichthe personwhose conduct
or characterare under considerationbelongs. Few people believe that morality
is a deductivesystemin whichall trueconclusionsfollowfromone simpleprinciple
withthe addition of purelyfactualpremises.Many believe thatall cogent moral
precepts are to some degree interdependent.
Walzer's theses, especiallythe firstand main one, are an attemptto give a
more precisearticulationto the intuitions.The argumentsforthe thesesare also
argumentsfortheintuitions.I willnotchallengeor discusstheunderlyingintuitions.
The only matterunder examination is the thesisthat moral argumentsare inIn challengingthisthesisI willbe challengingthatwayofunderstanding
terpretative.
and explaining the intuitions.But none of the followingargumentsis directed
against the intuitionsthemselves.It is possible to argue thatthe best verdicton
Walzer'sthesesis "notproven."There is too muchwhichis leftobscurein Walzer's
discussion to enable one to reach any substantiveconclusion. In particular,it is
unclear what he refersto when he speaks of moral argumentbeing "an interpretationofthemoralitythatexists."Three clustersofquestionsremainunresolved.
First,which of the existingmoralitiesdoes he have in mind? We generally
assume that differentmoralitiesare practicedor at least avowed (and therefore
can be said to exist) in differentsocieties,and, in pluralisticsocieties,different
moralitiesare practicedor avowed by differentsectionsof the population within
a single society.This briefstatementis itselfmerelyan abbreviateddescription
of a much more complex phenomenon of divisionsand crosscurrents.Which of
the differentmoralitieswhich exist is interpretedin valid moral arguments?
is involvedin moralargument?Consider
Second, whatkindof interpretation
some of the activitiesgenerally referredto as interpretative,such as that of
professionalinterpretersin multilingualinternationalconventions,the interpretation of musical compositionsby conductors,soloists,or orchestras,the interpretationof historicalevents at the hands of historians,the interpretationof
poems by literarycritics,the interpretationof dreams by psychoanalysts,the
interpretationof experimentaldata by natural scientists,and the interpretation
of legislationby the courts,to mentionbut a fewexamples. One need not hold
thatthere is nothingcommon to them all whichmeritsdescribingall of them as
interpretationsto suspect that these multifariousactivitiesdifferin important
respects.In particular,the standardsbywhichan interpretation
isjudged successful
or not seem to differ.In some cases success is a matterof all or nothing;in others
it is a matterof degree. In some cases mutuallyincompatibleinterpretations
may
be equallysuccessful;in otherstherecan be onlyone (complete)bestinterpretation.
In some cases a good interpretationis an artisticcreation.In othersit is a matter
of scientificconjecture or of logical deduction. Withoutknowingwhat kind of
interpretationmoral argumentis meant to be, it is difficult
to evaluate the thesis
that it is interpretative.4
Third, does Walzer mean moral argument to be an interpretationof the
moralitythatexiststo the exclusionof otheraspects of existingcultureand social
practices?To assume so is to assume thatmoralitycan be hived offfromthe rest

4. Saying that it is an interpretationof a social practice,if thatis what Walzer has in
mind,does nothelp,as thiskind,farfrombeinga culturally
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of culture and fromother social practices. It furtherassumes that these other
practicesdo not logicallyaffectthe contentof morality.5
Some aspects of these questions will be taken up below. But in the main I
withthe thesisthatmoral
willdisregardthem.There are, I willargue, difficulties
argumentsare interpretationsof the moralitythat existswhich transcendthese
weightyproblems, and which can receive at least a preliminaryconsideration
even before theyare resolved.
Before turningto the examinationof the theseswe mustconfrontthe question of their status,especially that of the first,the interpretativethesis. Is the
thesis that moral argument is interpretativea thesis about valid or successful
moral arguments,thatis, about what moral argumentsshould be like? Or is the
moral argumentswhich
thesisa statementof the nature of the run-of-the-mill
are made in conversationsand discussionsamong people, in committees,in the
media, etc.? Or is it a statementof the nature of the argumentsto be found in
the writingsof moral philosophers? Or, finally,is it itselfan interpretationof
common moral arguments,or alternatively,of the argumentsof moral philosophers?
In spite of some hesitationon the part of Walzer on thispoint,thereis only
one possible answer. The interpretativethesis can only be an interpretationof
common moral arguments,both philosophicaland other.To startwiththe thesis
cannot be a claim about whichmoral argumentsare cogentwithoutbeing a claim
about (at least some) existingmoral argumentsunless it is coupled withthe claim
that no cogent moral argumentshave ever been advanced. This is not a claim
that Walzer makes, nor is it a plausible claim to make. But veryfew people, if
and
any,have ever advanced moral argumentstheyengaged in as interpretative,
there is no reason to thinkthat no moral argumentwhichwas put forwardas a
argumentwas ever cogent. So the thesiscannot be a simple
non-interpretative
descriptionof (at least some) moral arguments.To be plausible at all, it has to
be taken as an interpretationof (at least some) moral arguments.
Can it be taken as interpretingonly cogent moral arguments?This can be
the case only if the featureof a moral argumentwhich enables one to interpret
it as interpretativeis a feature which occurs in (all) cogent argumentsand is
missingin all the others.This is not the way Walzer perceivesthe situation.The
action
quotation above concerningthe way an argumentregardingaffirmative
mightproceed is not meant to apply only to cogent argumentsabout affirmative
action. It fixeson the fact that such argumentsproceed throughan appeal to
notions such as equal opportunities,careers open to talents,etc. Clearly both
good and bad argumentshave been advanced in theseterms.This example shows
how unlikelyit is that the featuresof argumentswhich enable one to interpret
them as interpretativewill apply to all and only to cogent arguments.It follows
that since the thesismust apply to cogent moral arguments,it must apply to (at
least some) existingmoral arguments,and it followsfromthatthatit mustapply
to cogent and non-cogentmoral arguments,that is, that it is a thesisabout the
proper interpretationof moral argumentsgenerally.6
It also followsthatthe thesiscannot apply onlyto philosophicalmoral arguments.If philosophicalmoralargumentsare cogentonlyiftheyare interpretative,
5. I owe this point to Hilary Putnam.
6. Though it may allow thatsome moral arguments,perhaps even some cogent ones,
are not interpretations.
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thenit cannotbe the case thatthereare cogentnonphilosophicalmoralarguments
It followsthateithertherecannotbe nonphilosophical
whichare notinterpretative.
cogent moral argumentsor theyare interpretative.
Given thatnonphilosophical
argumentseitherreflector partlyconstitutethe moralitythat exists,if no nonphilosophical moral argumentsare cogent, it is a mysteryhow it could be that
the interpretationof the moralitythatexistscan yieldcogent moral arguments.
So we must conclude that the interpretativethesis is itselfan interpretationof
moralarguments(philosophicaland nonphilosophical,cogentand faulty)generally.
THE NON-IDENTITY

RESULT

Walzerdedicatesmuchattentionto hisauxiliarythesis,thatis,thattheinterpretative
thesisis compatiblewithsocialcriticism.
Much of his discussionis culturalhistorical
and has no philosophicalrelevance.Walzer'sexamples show thatvariouscultures
recognize a social role which can be described as that of a social critic,that is,
someone who is part of the core of the societyand its culture and criticizesit
fromthe inside, invokingits own shared values as the grounds of his criticism.
For reasons we need not go into,Walzer is anxious to show thata societycan be
criticizedby insiders fromthe inside. In his discussion of the phenomenon he
underplays the featureswhich make it special and contingentand creates the
impressionthat in his view all sound moral criticismof a societyis of this kind.
Forexample, ifhe does notaltogetherfailto notice,at theveryleasthe underplays
the factthat his illustrationsof the criticas an insiderare drawn fromsocieties
during periods in which their social practicesrecognized that position. Other
societiesdo not. They regard any substantialsocial criticismas betrayaland hold
thatby engaging in radical criticism,even when it sincerelyclaimsto be inspired
by common values, the critichas excluded himselffromthe social fold and has
shown himselfto be allied with the enemies of the societyhe criticizes.The
possible existence of Walzer's social criticis contingenton the practicesof the
societyconcerned.
Furthermore,
Walzer failsto separatethe social historicalphenomenonwhich
interestshim, that is, the possibilityof the socially recognized role of a social
criticas an insider,fromthe philosophical problem he is tryingto tackle. His
philosophical aim is to show that the moralitythat existscontains grounds for
moral criticism.The philosophical aim of the auxiliarythesis is to defend the
interpretativethesisfromthe charge that it is conservative.The charge of conservatismshould not be seen as a simple moral accusation of holding morally
mistakenviews. Rather it is meant to show that the interpretativethesis is a
mistakeninterpretationof moral arguments.Some moral argumentscan and do
lead to radical criticismof societies,theirinstitutionsand practices.Any account
of moral argumentswhich makes such criticismunintelligibleis mistaken.Apparentlyacceptingthispoint,Walzer claims thathis view of moral argumentsas
interpretationsof existingmoralityis consistentwith radical social criticismby
social critics.
But thisis an inadequate replyto theattemptedrefutation
of theinterpretative
thesis.Until we are shown thatan insider'scriticismis the only intelligibleform
of criticism,the question is bound to remain,Does the interpretative
thesisallow
room for all forms of criticismof a societythat are intelligible?What of the
widespreadcondemnationacrossthe worldof the massacreof studentssupporting
the democracy movementin Beijing in June 1989 (the Tienanmen Square example)? Many of the criticswere outsidersto the societythe actions of whose
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governmentwere condemned, and few of them bothered even to consider the
question whethertheircriticismcan be borne out by an interpretation
of Chinese
values. Most of them, one suspects,would regard that question as irrelevantto
the cogency of their criticism.Let us assume that their criticismis intelligible
and cogent, and an example of a common kind of moral claim. If so, then the
interpretativethesis is acceptable only if it can show that such moral criticism,
which is not the social criticismWalzer's second thesis addresses, is based on
interpretative
arguments.7Some aspects of these argumentswillresurfacelater.
For the presentI wish only to emphasize thattheyare not meant as a refutation
of Walzer'sview.They merelyshow thatifthe interpretative
thesisis to be shown
to be viable,a strongerthesisthan T2 needs to be established,thatis, thatmoral
criticismgenerallyis consistentwiththe view thatmoral argumentsare an interpretationof existingmorality.
Leaving thispoint on one side, thereis one conclusionof Walzer'sauxiliary
thesis (even in the limitedscope he gives it) which is crucial for the validityof
his views. Walzer's thesis is that the interpretativethesisleaves room for social
(which is a form of moral) criticism.Moral criticismof what? It clearlyleaves
room forcriticizingsocietyand itsinstitutions
forfailingto liveup to the morality
that exists. On the assumption' that the moralitythat existsis nothingbut the
moralityof the societycriticized,saying that societyand its institutionscan be
criticizedby the existingmoralityis no more than sayingthatsocietymay failto
live up to its own moral ideals. To affirmthat is no more than to affirmthe
possibilityof hypocrisy,duplicity,bad faith,self-deception,etc. But if this is all
thatT2 establishes,then it failsto do itsjob in defendingthe interpretative
thesis
fromthe charge of a conservatismwhich makes the possibilityof many moral
argumentsunintelligible.To rebut this criticismT2 must show that there can
be social criticismof social moralityitself.
Many moral argumentsare addressed againstvariousaspectsof the morality
thatexists.Vegetariansand environmentalists
criticizethe existingmoralityconcerning our attitude to nonhuman animals and to the natural environment.
Feministscriticizethe existing moralityconcerning the relations between the
sexes and gender roles. Examples of moral argumentsfromwithina society,that
is, ones which can qualifyas social criticismaddressed at the existingmorality
of the societyconcerned,are legion. And so are the moral argumentsaddressed
against the existingmoralitiesof foreigncountries.Admittedly,the notionof an
existingmoralityis problematical.There is no need, however,to attempta comprehensive clarificationof this idea. All we need are two assumptions clearly
made by Walzer, namely,first,that the existingmoralityis positivelycorrelated
to the moral beliefs of people, and to at least some of their social practices.
Second, that differentmoralitiesexist in differentsocieties (however societies
7. Alternatively,
Walzer mightshow that the Tienanmen Square example belongs to
an exceptionalnon-interpretative
kindof argument.This line of argumentis unpromising.
Those Britishpeople who condemned the massacre in Beijing are likelyto have feltthat
theywould have condemned a massacre in Trafalgar Square forexactlythe same reasons,
and that those reasons are typicalof many of theirmoral considerationswhen applied to
conditionsin Britishjails, forexample, or to administrative
detentionin NorthernIreland.
This makes it difficultto regard the Tienanmen Square example as displayinga special
kind of moral argument.
8. To be considered below.
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may be individuated).I willthereforeassume thatT2 assertsamong otherthings
thatthe interpretative
thesisleaves room fora criticismof the moralitythatexists.
It followsfromthis understandingof T2 that moralityis not identicalwith
(any) existingmorality.One can avoid this conclusion only by holding (1) that
moralitycan change, and (2) thatmoralitymaybe inconsistent.I willdemonstrate
these points by showing how T2 and the identityassumption yield the two
mentionedconclusions.

MoralChange
First,I will show that if existingmoralitiescan be morallycriticized,sometimes
successfully,then existingmoralitycan change. If existingmoralityis morality,
then moralitycan change. To show that this is so, we have to distinguishcases
of (alleged) moral advance in whichpreviouslyheld viewsand previouspractices
are rejected as mistaken,frommoral change in which theyare rejected on the
ground that while they were rightfor their time, they are no longer valid. If
moral criticismof existingmorality,the possibilityof whichis assertedby Walzer
in T2, can be sound, then moralitymustbe capable of developing away fromits
criticizedcondition. This does not assume that everyor any sound criticismof
moralitywill be effectivein generatingsuch a development. It merelyassumes
thatsuch a developmentis logicallypossible,thatit is coherent.This means that
the possibilityof sound moral criticismof existingmoralitypresupposes that
eithermoral advance or moral change (or both) is possible.
But on the identityassumption,there is no possibilityof moral advance in
existingmorality,9for moral advance assumes that the moralitythat existsnow
is rightand the moralitythat it displaced was wrong. That last assumption is
preciselywhat the identitythesisdenies. Since (tautologically)moralityis correct
moralityifexistingmoralityis morality,thenexistingmorality(at any givenpoint
in time)is correct,and cannotbe wrong.Therefore,ifmoralityis existingmorality,
moral advance is impossible. As we saw, this means that if sound criticismof
existingmoralityis possible, then so is moral change.
It is a commonplace of much moral philosophythat while people's moral
viewsand practicesmay change, moralitycannot. It is not obvious how precisely
one should understandthe no-changeprinciple.Clearly,therecan be some moral
change. When I was young, for example, it was morallywrong for me to drive
a car. Now it is morallypermissiblefor me to do so. Before the age of rapid
transportit was wrong for a person with ailing parents to go fiftymiles away
from home, for he would not have been able to get back home in a hurryif
needed. Today the moral situation has changed. Some moral changes reflect
changes in customs and mores rather than in technology.In what sense can
moralitybe supposed to be unchanging?
The followingseems a promisingway of understandingthe issue of moral
change. Any moral change is explained by referenceto the effectof a change
on unchanging principles. It is wrong to drive when one does not possess the
skilland capacities to control safetythe vehicle one is driving.Children do not
9. This is, of course, consistentwithindividualmoral advance. That is, the argument
shows only thatexistingmoralitycannot morallyadvance, forthatwould entailattributing
to it moral mistakes.No problems are involvedwiththe thoughtthatindividualsmay fall
prey to moral mistakesand may make genuine advances by ridding themselvesof such
mistakes.
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possess the requiredjudgment, strength,and skills.Adultsnormallydo. One has
a dutyto aid one's parents when theyare ill. Therefore,one should make sure
that one is in a position to do so. Before the advent of modern transportthis
meant remainingclose to home at timeswhen one's parentswere ill. Today, with
rapid transport,this is no longer true; the materialdistancesare not the same.
If any moralchange presupposesan unchangingmoralbackground,thenmorality
can be said to be unchanging.
Nothingin thisargumentassumes thatthereare ultimateunchangingmoral
principles.It is possible thatany given principleis capable of change, since there
is a possibilityof indefiniteregress.Even the principleswhichappear to us most
unmovable may turnout to be suited to certaincircumstancesand not to others.
But to make sense of thatwillrequire pointingto an unchangingmoral doctrine
in terms of which changing circumstancescan account for the moral change.
Furthermore,nothingin thisargumentpresupposes thatthereis a clear division
between factsand values. It is not assumed thatany moral change is accounted
forby a change of factsagainst a backgroundof unchangingmorality,if thatis
a coherentdoctrine.Only a difference,relativeto everyinstanceof moralchange,
between changing circumstancesand unchanging principlesis assumed.
Must there be a way of explaining moral change? Perhaps all that one can
sayof moralchange is thatsomethingwas rightuntilnow and somethingdifferent
and incompatibleis rightfromnow (the boundaryneed not be precise),and that
is it. There may be no explanation of the change. But to say thisis to accept that
moralityis unintelligibleto us. If in principle we can explain, if we can make
intelligiblewhy one thing is rightfromtoday,we must also be able to explain
whyit was not rightbefore. Presumably,the explanation of what makes it right
now does not apply to the time up to now. So it provides the constantwhich
explains change. If it does apply to the time up to now and yetwe hold that in
spite of that,what is rightfromnow was not rightbefore,then it is a mystery
in what sense the explanation explains why this is right from now. By that
explanation the same was rightbeforenow as well. So at best it is an incomplete
of morality,an explanation
explanation. So, shortof givingup the intelligibility
of moral change where it occurs must be in principleavailable.
Must such an explanationproceed throughfindinga constantelementwhich
makes some changing featureof the situationaccount forthe moral change? I
cannot see what else is possible. The only escape fromthisconclusion seems to
me to be thatthe constantelement which explains moral change need not itself
be a moral considerationor principle.But I cannot thinkof an account showing
how it could be anythingelse.
Can there be a special kind of moral change whichis interpretative
change,
which does not presuppose a persistingmoral principle?This kind of change
mightoccur when membersof a societyreinterprettheirprevious practicesand
beliefsand come to see themin a new light(leading to a change of both practices
and beliefs). This may be possible, but it leaves open the question: From their
new perspectivecan theythinkof theirpreviousviews(i.e., theirinterpretations)
as havingbeen wrongand supplanted bybetterones, or musttheythinkof them
as having been rightfor theirtime but now superseded by somethingwhich is
rightforthe new times?Interpretativechange does not escape the considerations
advanced above.
My argumentis (a) thatthe possibilityof moral criticismof existingmorality
entails,on the identityassumption,that there is moral change, and (b) thatany
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moralchange presupposesan unchangingmoralbackground.Is thereanyconflict
betweenthe twoconclusions?Since b allows considerableroom formoralchange,
thereis conflictonly ifa requiresthe possibilityof moral change of a kind which
the argument above does not allow. That it does is not obvious. The limitsof
moral change I have argued fordo not immunizeany particularmoral principle
fromthe change. It is true that T2 by itselfis consistentwith formsof moral
change which are inconsistentwiththe argumentI advanced. For example, it is
thatexistingMoralitywillbe so radicallytransformed
consistentwiththe possibility
thatit will have nothingin common withitsancestor.Or thatit willchange with
regard to its most abstractprinciples,continuitybeing provided at the level of
middle-rangeprinciples.This second possibilityseems to be in line with much
of what we know of changes in moral practicesand beliefs.It also seems very
much in tunewiththe spiritof the generalviewsof supportersof the interpretative
thesis,including Walzer. The lesson of my argumentis that if such changes in
existingmoralityare to be entertained,then moralitycannot be identifiedwith
social morality.

andInconsistency
Morality
Whateverone's view regardingmoral change, the non-identity
of moralitywith
existingmorality,given T2, followsstraightforwardly
froma simple argument:
T2 states that there can be moral criticismof existingmorality.If moralityis
existingmorality,then existingmoralityprovides grounds for criticizingitself.
This means more than that the practiceswhich constituteor which underpin
existingmoralitycontain the seeds fortheirown transformation.
This last claim
is an unexceptionalclaim thatcertainsocial practicesare unstable. Social theory
has done much to explain the various structureswhich make social practices
intrinsically
unstable. But T2, on the identityassumption,claims more. It states
thatexistingmoralitycontainspropositionswhichare groundsforrejectingsome
propositionsof existingmorality.Since moralityincludes only (can be correctly
statedonly by) true propositions,it followsthataccordingto T2 and the identity
assumption,moralityincludes grounds for believingthat true propositionsare
false. Moreover,since according to T2 such moral criticismof existingmorality
can be successful,it followsthaton these assumptionsit is epistemicallypossible
that certainmoral propositionsare false.
The epistemic possibilityentailed by T2 applies to people who know that
existing moralityis morality.For example, according to T2 and the identity
assumption,a person, call him Michael, who believes in both must believe that
it is possible given all he knowsthatcertainpropositionsof existingmoralityare
false. This commits him to believing that it is possible that moralitycontains
propositionswhich are both true (because they correctlystate the content of
morality)and false(because theremaybe other-equally true-moral propositions
providingadequate grounds to hold them to be false). Since this is impossible,
Michael must rejecteitherT2 or the identityassumption.Since Michael Walzer
endorses T2, he is committedto rejectingthe identityassumption.
WHOSE MORALITY SHOULD BE INTERPRETED?
The rejectionof the identityassumptioncannot be avoided by abandoning T2,
foras we saw, T2 is essentialforthe plausibilityof the interpretative
thesis.Can
the interpretativethesissurvivethe rejectionof the identityassumption?One's
intuitionssuggest that it cannot. The interpretativethesis seems particularly
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appealing when understood as sayingthatmoral argumentsconsistin the interpretationof morality.But perhaps in this form the thesis is too strongfor its
own good. Whetheror not moralargumenthas anythingto do withinterpretation,
it seems plausible that it proceeds fromwithinmorality(though not exclusively
itis plausiblethatitshould includeinterpretations
so). If itcontainsinterpretation
of moral propositions.But puttingmattersin thiswaydenudes the interpretative
thesis,as understoodby Walzer and itsother supporters,of itspoint. It is bound
to seem to thema trivializationof the thesis.Its poignancyderivesfromthe point
that moral argument is the interpretationof existingmorality.This phrase is
now too ambiguous forus to continue using it. As we saw,it suggestson the one
hand that it is positivelycorrelatedto existingpracticesand to common beliefs
and on the other hand thatit is morality(i.e., thatexistingmoralityis morality).
Having rejected the second point, let us replace "existingmorality"with"social
morality,"a phrase whose use will remain suitablyvague. The only definite
commitmentinvolvedin itsuse is to a positivecorrelationbetweensocial morality
and social practicesand common beliefs. This correlationenables us to relate
social moralityto particulargroups. They can be said to be the social moralities
of the groups with whose practicesand beliefstheycorrelate.I will referto a
social moralityof an individualif the individualbelongs to a group whose social
moralityit is. All these notions are veryproblematical,and if the interpretative
thesissurvives,theyshould all receive detailed scrutiny.
Some familiarquestions cannot be avoided. Whose social moralityshould
be interpretedto produce a sound moral conclusion? Suppose that Adam is
conversingwith Angela about Beth's conduct or character.Is Adam's claim to
be supported by an interpretationof his social moralityor by thatof Angela, or
bythatof Beth,or bysome combinationof the three?Walzer providesno answer,
as his discussion assumes that all three share the same social morality.That
assumptioncan always be relied upon only if one accepts the view,inimicalto
Walzer's thought,that there is and can only be one social morality.Given that
there are several social moralities,and that it is possible and proper for people
who belongto a groupwhichhas one socialmoralityto formjudgmentsconcerning
the characterand conduct of people belonging to other groups withdifferent
social moralities,the familiarquestions cannot be avoided.
Let us consider firstthe possibilitythatBeth's social morality(i.e., the social
moralityof the group she is a memberof) is the relevantone. This supposition
has two unwelcome consequences:
1. The interpretativethesis so understood,that is, that moral argumentis
an interpretationof the social moralityof the person under discussion, is an
incorrectinterpretationof moral argument.One example will stand for many.
Few, if any, of those membersof the Westerndemocracies or of other cultures
(excludingthe Chinese) who condemned in theirhearts,in word,or in deed the
Tienanmen Square Massacre of June 1989 regarded the interpretationof the
relevantChinese culture as theirargument in defense of theircondemnation.
By and large, their position was: The massacre is inexcusable, and if Chinese
social moralitycondones it, so much the worse for Chinese social morality.
2. EitherHitlerwas rightto adopt the Final Solution or he would have been
righthad he succeeded betterto change his societyafterhis own image. I am
not alleging that the Final Solution was supported by the best interpretationof
the German social moralityof the time,nor am I claimingthatifit was not,then
it would have been relativelyeasy forthe Nazis to intensifytheiractions so that
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German social moralitywould have changed to suittheirpurposes. It is possible
that such changes require long periods and are only under limitedintentional
controlof anyone, howeverpowerful.My point is merelythatthe interpretative
thesis understood as requiring the interpretationof the social moralityof the
people whose conductand characterare under considerationcreatesthe possibility
that the Final Solution was just. Its justice becomes a contingentmatter.It all
depends on German social practicesat the time.
There is one way of escaping this second conclusion. One may endorse a
view of how a social morality(or social practices)should be interpretedwhich
argumentsupportinggenocide
makes it impossibleto constructan interpretative
it may make
on the basis of any social morality,be it what it may (alternatively,
it impossible to view genocide as supported by a social morality,whateverthe
practicesand beliefsof the relevantcommunitymay be). The problemwiththis
whichare recommended
escape routeis thatitrelieson methodsof interpretation
on the ground thattheyrule out certainresults."1 This means thatcertainmoral
method
claims(e.g., thatgenocide is wrong)are presupposedbythe interpretative
thesis.11
and are not supported by it, which refutesthe interpretative
Given theseconsiderations,we can abandon thesuppositionthatBeth'ssocial
moralityis to be interpretedby argumentsconcerningher conduct or character.
Let us then considerthe possibilitythatit is Adam's social moralitywhichcounts.
Given this supposition, the interpretativethesis has no bearing on the third
intuitioninspiringWalzer'swritingson thisissue, namely,the intuitionthatours
is not the only morallydecent society.Given that even when we morallyjudge
other people who belong to remote cultureswe do so on the basis of the interpretationof our social morality,there is nothingin the interpretativethesisto
lead to the moral pluralism favored by Walzer. The interpretativethesis can
guarantee moral pluralismonly if it requires us to interpreta pluralityof social
moralities.Since it does not do so, it does not in any obvious way respond to the
pluralisticintuition.
thesisas callingforthe
withunderstandingthe interpretative
The difficulty
interpretationof the speaker's social moralityis that it entails that moral truth
is perspectival.The reason is simple and familiar.Adam and Angela may have
differentsocial moralities,whose interpretationmay yield inconsistentverdicts
on Beth's actions or character.Since moral claims well supported by an interpretationof the speaker's social moralityare true,it followseitherthatmorality
is self-contradictory
or thatAdam's verdicton Beth is true forhim,or ratherfor
anyone who shares his perspective,and Angela's verdictis trueforher,or rather
foranyonewho sharesher perspective.That meansthatmoraltruthis perspectival.
Each social moralitydefines a perspectiveand everyspeaker's truthholds only
forthose who share the same social morality.
The only way to avoid thisconclusionis to hold thatpeople can formmoral
judgments only on people of the same social morality.But thiswould be a moral

10. There is no logical necessityhere, but I can thinkof no other reason whysuch
morallybiased methods of interpretationshould be accepted.
methodand be used to support
11. Cannot theyboth be yieldedby the interpretative
it? Such bootstrappingwould be acceptable if it does not consistin a narrowcircle. I do
to construct
not know
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judgment which,as the Tienanmen Square example shows,is not a true interpretationof my social morality.Therefore,this escape route is blocked.12
The perspectivalview of moral truthrevivesthe problem illustratedby the
example of the Final Solution in a somewhatdifferentform.Accordingto the
perspectivalview, it is possible that it is true for Hitler (i.e., for anyone who
shares the perspectivewhichis in facthis) thatgenocide is permissible,and that
the Final Solution was morallyrequired. It is true that for me this is false. But
whyshould I care especiallyabout what is true for me, ratherthan about what
is true for Hitler? After all, it is his actions and character which are under
consideration.Should we not judge him by what is true for him? Could he be
blamed for not conformingto moral principleswhich are true for me but not
forhim? I raise these as genuine questions. Possiblytruthjust means thatwhat
mattersto me is what is true forme. But the notion of perspectivaltruthis very
obscure,and itscredentialsand implicationshave neverbeen workedout properly.
THE REFUTATION

So farI have drawnattentionto some of the implicationsof,and as yetunresolved,
with the interpretativethesis. One considerationseems, however,to
difficulties
telldecisivelyagainstthe thesis.As noted at the outset,regardingmoralarguments
in thiscontext.
as interpretative
raisesthe questionof interpreting
"interpretation"
But one thingabout interpretationis clear: it is an intentionalactivity.
We cannot interpretexcept when we intendto. Suppose thatAngela (having
earliertold him of a dream of hers) sayssomethingto Adam, to whichhe replies:
"This could be the interpretationof your (i.e., Angela's) dream." In thiscase it
was Adam's interpretation,not Angela's. She, admittedly,provided the content.
But the intentionto take it as an interpretationwas Adam's. The same holds for
anyinterpretation
of a Shakespearean play,or of experimentalscientific
findings,
or of the SovietUnion's European policy.Many thingsare possibleinterpretations.
But one does not offeran interpretation
just because one puts a possible interpretationforward.One has to offerit as an interpretationto be interpreting,
thoughone may intendit as an interpretationunder a different
description.For
example, one may intend to translatethe speech, and one's translationis also
an interpretation.Or one may intend to performthe piano sonata, and one's
performanceis also an interpretation.This is due to the fact that translations
and performancesare interpretations,and anyone who knows what they are
knows that. Notice in particularthat the factthat one was inspiredby a poem
to writeanother, or to writea piece of prose, does not make one's writingan
interpretationof the poem. Interpretationcannot be explained in purelycausal
terms.It has to be meant as such.
It follows that moral argumentsare not interpretations,for they are not
meant as such. Consider ordinaryargumentsagainst deceit. Deceit, people say,
is unfair-it is takingunfairadvantage of others.Or theywillsay thatto deceive
is to use a person and not to treathim as a person. Or theywill say thatdeceit
underminestrustand raisessuspicionswhichmake communicationmore difficult,
to the long-termdetrimentof everyone.Various otherargumentsor variantson
12. Could the propositionthat people can morallycriticizeonly those sharing their
own social moralitybe supported as a nonmoralpropositon,thatis, on nonmoralgrounds?
of doing
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argumentswill be advanced. But none of them is meant to be about the correct
interpretationof our social morality.They do not even feel similarto arguments
about the practicespeople have and the interpretationone should put on them.
I do not deny that referenceto social practicesplays an importantrole in such
arguments. The other day, while visitinganother country,I said to my son:
"Everyone asks me how you like it here and I have to say that I do not know."
"But," he retorted,"no one expects a truthfulanswer to this question." If this
is the expectation,then no one would be deceived bywhateverI may say in reply
to the question, and I need not worrythat I do not know the correctanswer.
Practicesare centralto the question of when one is deceived. But theyare
onlymarginalto the question of whyitis wrongto deceive. Similarconsiderations
apply to defamation,violatingpropertyrights,insults,showingkindness,demonstratingone's love, pullingrank,etc. In othercases (e.g., causing seriousbodily
injury,denying people food, or exposing them to severe cold, etc.), practices
figurehardly at all in moral arguments.Similar points apply to the examples
used by Walzer, and cited above. Social practicesare relevantfor establishing
factsabout discrimination,its effects,and the most effectiveways of combating
it. It is less obvious what they have to do withjustifyingthe underlyingmoral
position,forexample, thatthe stateshould take action to combat discrimination
by,let us say,encouraginganyone who benefitsfromstatefundsto adopt certain
policies, etc. There are, of course, social practices,which eitherconformto or
are at odds with such views. But it is not clear why I or anyone else should be
deterredfromadvocating a moral positionwhich is at odds withthe best interpretationof such policies.
We know that people rarelyadvocate moral positionswhich do not have
rootsin the social moralityof theircommunity,past or present.That factis often
explained as relevant to their abilityto gain access to the media, or to their
withthe public only. It seems to me plausible to assume
rhetoricaleffectiveness
thatthe rootednessin one's culturehas greatersignificance.But even so, it does
not follow that moral argumentsare interpretationsof social morality.To be
that,they have to refer to social moralityas a reason for a moral claim. This
theydo not normallydo, except in the circumscribedway described. There are
numerousanalogies in otherfieldsfora connectednesswhichcannotbe explained
in termsof reasons. There is more than an accidental connectionbetween the
nerve structureof my sense organs and my abilityto see that the lamp in front
of me is yellow.It does not followand is, in fact,false,thatthe neural structure
of my sense organs is a reason forbelievingthat the lamp is yellow.
One may object to this argument on the ground that it takes too much at
of what
thesisclaimsthatthe correctinterpretation
face value. The interpretative
moral arguers intend is that they intend it as an interpretationof their social
morality.There are two ways of developing this objection. The firstis to allege
that moral arguers, whatever their conscious intentions,have an unconscious
intentionto interprettheir social morality.However, I know of no reason to
believe in such an unconscious intent. More promisingis the second way of
developing the objection, which is to suggest that moral argumentswhich are
meant to be discoveriesof unknown moral truths,etc., are betterunderstoodif
they are redescribed as interpretations.Therefore, they are intentionalinterpretations,but not under thisdescription.
with this way of defendingthe thesisis that it does violence
The difficulty
thisallows
some
redescription,
As weonsaw,
ofinterpretation.
to theintentional
aspect
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but onlyon conditionthatthe new descriptionis such thatthosewho understand
knowthatifone applies, the otherdoes as well.The redescriptionof an argument
advanced as workingout what is the only rationalthingfora moral agent to do,
or as workingout God's will,etc.,as an interpretation
of the social morality,does
not meet thiscondition.Among other considerations,such redescription,if adequate, denies one the possibilityof criticizingthose people forengaging in the
wrong sortof argument.
This argumentshows only that not all moral argumentsare interpretative.
No one can claim thatno moral argumentis interpretative
in part.As I suggested
earlier,clearly,many are interpretative
in part. But it can be shown thatnormal
moral argumentsare not entirelyinterpretativeof social morality.To interpret
is to put forward(under suitableconditions)something(such as a performance
or a statement)as beingor renderingthe meaningof something.An interpretation
of social moralityis just that. It states the content(meaning) of social morality.
This can be a moral argumentonly if moralityis (identicalwith)social morality.
As was shown earlier, it is not. Therefore, while the interpretationof social
moralitycan play a role in moral argument,moral argumentcannot consistof
just such an interpretation.
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